Independence Delaware's Drought Planning Strategy
The First State has gone from a generic, unworkable plan to a super-customized, well-proven plan.
In May 2006, a new reservoir in Newark, DE, was dedicated. Stewart Lovell, Delaware state water supply manager, says that while he attended the ceremony, he was reminded of how far the state has come with drought planning over the years.
Delaware has responded to seven drought events during the past 25 years. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s the region experienced a few dry periods, but before anyone could take much notice or get seriously concerned about them they were over, according to Lovell.
“All the events that were noticed paled in comparison to what happened in 1995. We’d been using the statewide drought plan that had been adopted in 1983 and prompted by the 1980–1981 drought. When that hit, the mid-Atlantic region people started to take notice. The drought had a long duration but wasn’t as severe as it could have been,” says Lovell.
A few years later Delaware’s Drought Committee developed one in a series of books dealing with water supply issues across the board. Entitled Water Conservation, the book contained an outline of a drought plan basically lifted from what the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) had. This plan was tweaked slightly to fit Delaware’s needs, but still not changed significantly.
Perhaps the biggest drought challenge in the 1980s for Delaware was dealing with the DRBC plan. Two distinct flaws made the plan unsuitable for the state, from both a policy and a technical standpoint. The technical basis of the state’s rejection came from the fact that the guidelines proved to be inappropriate for the situation Delaware found itself in.
“Because the drought guidelines were developed in a vacuum without the benefit of actual experience in the declaration of a drought emergency, we found them too broad in some areas and completely missing in other areas,” says Lovell. “The premise of all these measures was to reduce what had been traditionally and inappropriately called ‘non-essential’ water use. The plan’s definition of essential water use was flawed. Outdoor water use for a business depending upon it is always essential. Essential use does not always mean ‘water for potable uses only.’”
Not only were residential customers greatly affected by the drought; industries dependent on outdoor water use also were affected. Provisions had never been made for operations such as golf courses, nurseries, turf farms, and landscaping businesses.
Delaware also had problems with the “Basin Drought Operating Plan” and the “Lower Basin Drought Operating Plan.” Over the nearly 300 miles that the entire Delaware River Basin spans from north to south, hydrologic conditions can vary considerably. The problem is that drought responses also vary widely.
If the whole basin was declared to be in a drought, that would include reservoirs in the upper part of the basin, which serve New York City. “That has nothing to do with Delaware,” says Lovell. “We found ourselves on several occasions, mostly in the 1981 and 1985 droughts, where the upper basin was really hurting, and we were too, but not nearly as severely as they were. The DRBC declared a basin-wide drought emergency and we said no. Things were completely out of sync. They were having a severe drought and we were OK; then later that year, when the upper basin received plenty of rainfall and we did not, the DRBC declared the drought over; however, we still were suffering.”
Delaware wanted the ability to control its own destiny. In 1988 the state decided it would develop its own localized drought plan and formed the local Christina River Basin Committee to handle its problems. This formed the genesis of the splitting away from the directives of the DRBC. Based on the success that Delaware had in developing its own local plan, the DRBC adopted a policy that let states do what they wanted.
“We enabled other states to gain the freedom to do drought planning if they desired,” says Lovell. “Though some states in the region are still struggling with drought management, much of it comes down to that fact that these states still insist on maintaining a statewide dictum on what drought conditions are. They have yet to regionalize their approach to the degree Delaware has.”
Biggest Challenge of the 1990s and Beyond
The droughts in 1995, 1999, and 2002 became progressively worse as each one occurred. The drought of 2002 became the worst one since water records have been kept, breaking the record of the 1963 drought. “After ’95 when we threw everything we had out the door, we were just handling things very much by the ‘seat of the pants.’ Once we saw what the droughts were doing to the businesses and how they revolted en masse, that led us to sit down and form a coalition working group to completely revise the way we worked,” says Lovell.
The basis of what determined Delaware’s drought status under the DRBC was a simplistic indicator system developed by a part-time, non-permanent seasonal employee whom Lovell replaced. It was based on just two parameters: stream flows and precipitation.
“I didn’t like this simple index at all and I said so,” says Lovell. “But I was roundly ignored. When the big drought hit in 1995, we were in the midst of an emergency situation and our indictor was not even showing us to be in drought status yet.
“Some of the old indicators, such as measuring stream flow with one stream gauge or precipitation from one station, clearly gave us a very limited picture. At that point Delaware, as everywhere else, was at the dawn of Internet capabilities, including hydrological monitoring capabilities. We were able to put our finger on so much more information in near real time shortly after the drought,” says Lovell.
Water sources for this entire region are spread out over a wide area. Therefore the state was now able to look at far more indicators simultaneously than it ever had before. It was also able to evaluate what the available supply was on nearly an instantaneous basis, compared to what the demand pattern looked like.
“The network of water suppliers was so tight and we had such a good line of communication with them that they would feed us daily demand data,” says Lovell. “That’s how we developed this much more sophisticated drought monitoring and response plan. The Internet information greatly aided access and became more and more sophisticated in subsequent droughts.”
That allowed the state to begin documenting all the different indices that are now in its plan. The state now has 13 different indicators, including access to each stream gauge on public water supply streams and access to a number of gauges outside the state of Delaware.
Delaware also uses time-ranked precipitation totals from two precipitation stations because it has also found out that one station tends to over-report and another tends to under-report, so it blends them together to have an even better picture.
The state also uses reservoir water levels. The Octorara Reservoir providing water to Chester, PA, out of which the state taps, was also used for some supply. Groundwater levels are used as well. Lovell especially objected to the old system because groundwater levels were not accounted for. Records for some of Delaware’s groundwater wells go back 50 years.
“Groundwater data had largely, and mistakenly, been ignored,” says Lovell. “But now we use everything we can put our hands on when it comes to data, including groundwater data. The really significant feature to the present system is that not one of them and not all of these various condition indicators dictate what our response action is. It’s pure guidance because the indicators are only that, not triggers. That’s an important distinction.”
Another resource in studying drought, according to Gerald K. Kauffman, water coordinator for northern Delaware, comes from a close look at the trees within the state. Kauffman, who is also the director of the University of Delaware’s Water Resources Agency, says the state had just finished with the 1999 drought, which at the time Delaware felt was one of the more significant droughts it’d ever had, and then three years later in 2002 it had the Great Mid-Atlantic Drought. “This was the 25th worst drought in the region since approximately 367 AD,” says Kauffman. “Our records from data recorded along the Brandywine Creek only extend back to 1911 and the precipitation record only back to 1895. We analyzed tree ring data compiled by the Columbia University Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory to extend a simulated Brandywine Creek stream flow record back almost 1,700 years.
“The literature indicates that the thin rings studied are much more useful in correlating drought conditions than the wider rings that may indicate wet, cooler years. Thin tree ring width is perhaps most especially useful in extending drought records back in time.”
Going Against the Flow in Drought Planning
Many states in the Delaware River Basin Commission use hard, fixed triggers that say when you have water at point “x” you declare this type of a drought; when at point “y” and when at “z” you are at the next step. “We do not have that system,” says Lovell. “Ours is actually more of a happenstance system because we aren’t a huge reservoir-driven water supply system, as in a lot of areas, where everything they do is based on preserving reservoir storage capacity. With ours we have such a different mix of water sources that we can’t simply say when we reach ‘x’ we take that certain action.”
Delaware’s indicators have been grouped into what generally would apply to a certain drought status. But that doesn’t mean that when any one of them or all of them are in that range, the state has to take that action. In the past, when a range was reached there was a general agreement on what the corresponding action should be.
“But it’s not a trigger, per se,” says Lovell. “It doesn’t mean we are going to declare a drought warning, drought watch, or drought emergency. We don’t have a tremendous amount of reservoir storage, but it’s been proven we have more capability with the reservoirs than we’ve given ourselves credit for.”
Delaware’s drought “acid test” occurred when the state’s governor hired a consultant to do the analysis in the aftermath of the record drought of 2002. The consultant reported that the state had come through the drought with more water than anyone on the Eastern Seaboard, according to Lovell. “The state was in tremendous shape. It was well managed—including cooperation from state residents who were fairly responsive in controlling their discretionary water use,” says Lovell.
For the lower part of the state there is so much fresh, available groundwater relative to the population that it is virtually impossible for this area of Delaware to have a supply shortage. But when studies were done on population growth trends in the north, including estimates of water availability, the supply and demand lines were going to cross at some point in the future.
“They started thinking about all kinds of long-distance transmission lines to bring untold gallons of water north,” says Lovell. “The idea of that, politically, went down in flames.”
But when the 1999 drought occurred, the state still had a much better system. “Ironically, everyone was happy,” says Lovell. “They had the latitude they needed to be able to just get by but keep running their businesses. The governor at the time expected the drought to end as if it was scheduled. But actually it kept getting worse and worse. Panic set in.”
When Pennsylvania experienced the 1999 drought, it also had a revolt by golf courses and sports field managers and other outdoor concerns, resulting in its own changes in its plan and its restrictions. The template developed by the DRBC had to be adapted by that state too.
“But Delaware’s revisions are much more fine-tuned,” says Lovell. “Pennsylvania made some general revisions, which loosened things up for the outdoor water-use businesses, but we had more direct input from businesses involved.”
A new plan was implemented in 2002. “That plan worked like a charm and the administration trusted what we were doing. We got through without a hitch. The rules were established for how the outdoor businesses were going to run—we let them stay operational. We also received excellent cooperation from the public. They were willing to put up with a little inconvenience knowing that the utilities were taking positive steps to increase their supplies,” says Lovell.
A Pair of Water Projects Holds Part of the Answer for Newark
In 1990, Ron Gardner took office as the mayor of a Delaware city still grappling with water-quality and -supply problems. Newark’s aging water system had a limited capacity and used wells contaminated with water containing large quantities of iron.
 |
Photo: University of Delaware |
| Newark Reservoir, August 2005 |
The mayor insisted something be done. He assembled a panel of various agency representatives and other experts in the field. This group met for approximately one year on a regular basis, coming up with a number of solutions. The idea of a new reservoir was not something they considered then; they’d concentrated on fixing up what they had because it was in such a deteriorated condition.
“After years of indecision, Newark finally implemented one of the recommendations our department championed for years: the need to build an iron removal plant so that millions of gallons of pumpable yet undrinkable groundwater could be used,” says Lovell.
“It took them over a decade; but they finally got the iron removal plant built, dedicated in 2003. At the same time they were rolling along on that track, the extremely bad droughts came and showed the city how insufficient the water supply was.”
Even with the addition of new well capacity, the City of Newark still did not have enough. The city became disgruntled with buying water from another utility, as this was getting fairly expensive. “They bit the bullet and said they were going to build a new reservoir and put an end to all of this nonsense,” says Lovell.
The result of all this was the building of a 300-million-gallon reservoir, providing 100% self-sufficiency for Newark. Funding for this project came from multiple sources, including bond issues, across-the-board rate increases, and state contributions. “That’s where Newark is right now,” says Lovell. “The reservoir was only just filled during the spring of 2006. Testing is currently being done to make sure the controls and flows are the way they are supposed to be.”
White Clay Creek, the stream that is the city’s main water-supply source, has high turbidity during periods of excess water flow. Now at those times the city can simply switch to using the reservoir water. This makes the reservoir something that helps with quality issues as well. The reservoir has other uses than backup supply, but that is primarily what it’s used for.
Both the nascent Newark reservoir and Wilmington’s reservoir are 100% pump storage facilities. They don’t have river flow to keep them filled, and both have a very small drainage area to help with recharge. However, if a thunderstorm occurs upstream, the fact that it didn’t happen directly over the water body doesn’t matter. When the surge in extra water occurs in the creek, that extra amount is pumped up to the reservoirs.
Planning Ahead
One of the main goals of Delaware’s water agencies in 2000 was to assemble 2 billion gallons of water supply by 2003. This was something the governor wanted fast-tracked, according to Kauffman.
Kauffman feels that Delaware’s being a small state may have contributed to the success it has had in accomplishing what it has with drought planning. “It’s rare that there would be a move in six years from the concept of implementing water storage and then getting it in the ground,” says Kauffman. “That’s a pretty quick turnaround. An important reason is that former Governor Carper recognized this to be a priority at the highest level of state government and our current Governor Ruth Anne Minner has continued the priority by amending the 2000 law, the ‘Water Supply Coordinating Council Act,’ in 2003 by expanding its role statewide for a term to expire in 2010.
“Therefore Delaware has taken the bold step of breaking the age-old procrastination cycle, the so-called hydro-illogical cycle, with drought planning and preparation, much to its credit.”
 |
Photo: University of Delaware |
| The reservoir provides Newark with 100% self-sufficiency. |
A main lesson learned in the course of fixing the state’s drought plan is the discovery that, because of the multiple uses for water, it is impossible to predict what a simple water-use restriction is going to do to someone. “We think we have the bases covered,” says Lovell. “But there are always surprises out there too. You must make a decision, and the best thing you could ever do is not have to declare a drought emergency because the panic that sets in is hard to predict or gauge.
“Panic brings out the worst in people to a large degree. As good as we have crafted our rules, you don’t want to have to impose them. People tend to become unpredictable in their behavior—to say the least. Some will scavenge every drop to water their plants; others will call and tell you that they pay their bills and that they can use as much water as they want; these same people will then turn their sprinklers on in the middle of the day just to spite us.”
Lovell feels that Delaware, in effect, now has a new drought operating plan it will probably never have to use. “That’s the bottom line,” says Lovell. “We’ve learned so much about what our needs are, and how to handle the drought issues, and added the new supply [eventually an extra 2 billion gallons of storage to the system], plus various new projects. It would take the region being transformed into Arizona for the state to be in trouble. I just don’t see that happening.”
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That the East Coast simply doesn’t stay dry works in Delaware’s favor. The state, like others in the region, gets rainfall even during a drought. “But now we have the capability to capture any storm runoff,” adds Lovell. “Any stray thunderstorms will yield water that now may be pumped off-stream up to the reservoirs. We’re constantly able to refill them. I rest much easier knowing that we can handle nearly anything that nature can hit us with. Now I’m not going to worry—at least about drought issues.”
March-April 2007
Independence Delaware's Drought Planning Strategy
The First State has gone from a generic, unworkable plan to a super-customized, well-proven plan.
In May 2006, a new reservoir in Newark, DE, was dedicated. Stewart Lovell, Delaware state water supply manager, says that while he attended the ceremony, he was reminded of how far the state has come with drought planning over the years.
Delaware has responded to seven drought events during the past 25 years. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s the region experienced a few dry periods, but before anyone could take much notice or get seriously concerned about them they were over, according to Lovell.
“All the events that were noticed paled in comparison to what happened in 1995. We’d been using the statewide drought plan that had been adopted in 1983 and prompted by the 1980–1981 drought. When that hit, the mid-Atlantic region people started to take notice. The drought had a long duration but wasn’t as severe as it could have been,” says Lovell.
A few years later Delaware’s Drought Committee developed one in a series of books dealing with water supply issues across the board. Entitled Water Conservation, the book contained an outline of a drought plan basically lifted from what the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) had. This plan was tweaked slightly to fit Delaware’s needs, but still not changed significantly.
Perhaps the biggest drought challenge in the 1980s for Delaware was dealing with the DRBC plan. Two distinct flaws made the plan unsuitable for the state, from both a policy and a technical standpoint. The technical basis of the state’s rejection came from the fact that the guidelines proved to be inappropriate for the situation Delaware found itself in.
“Because the drought guidelines were developed in a vacuum without the benefit of actual experience in the declaration of a drought emergency, we found them too broad in some areas and completely missing in other areas,” says Lovell. “The premise of all these measures was to reduce what had been traditionally and inappropriately called ‘non-essential’ water use. The plan’s definition of essential water use was flawed. Outdoor water use for a business depending upon it is always essential. Essential use does not always mean ‘water for potable uses only.’”
Not only were residential customers greatly affected by the drought; industries dependent on outdoor water use also were affected. Provisions had never been made for operations such as golf courses, nurseries, turf farms, and landscaping businesses.
Delaware also had problems with the “Basin Drought Operating Plan” and the “Lower Basin Drought Operating Plan.” Over the nearly 300 miles that the entire Delaware River Basin spans from north to south, hydrologic conditions can vary considerably. The problem is that drought responses also vary widely.
If the whole basin was declared to be in a drought, that would include reservoirs in the upper part of the basin, which serve New York City. “That has nothing to do with Delaware,” says Lovell. “We found ourselves on several occasions, mostly in the 1981 and 1985 droughts, where the upper basin was really hurting, and we were too, but not nearly as severely as they were. The DRBC declared a basin-wide drought emergency and we said no. Things were completely out of sync. They were having a severe drought and we were OK; then later that year, when the upper basin received plenty of rainfall and we did not, the DRBC declared the drought over; however, we still were suffering.”
Delaware wanted the ability to control its own destiny. In 1988 the state decided it would develop its own localized drought plan and formed the local Christina River Basin Committee to handle its problems. This formed the genesis of the splitting away from the directives of the DRBC. Based on the success that Delaware had in developing its own local plan, the DRBC adopted a policy that let states do what they wanted.
“We enabled other states to gain the freedom to do drought planning if they desired,” says Lovell. “Though some states in the region are still struggling with drought management, much of it comes down to that fact that these states still insist on maintaining a statewide dictum on what drought conditions are. They have yet to regionalize their approach to the degree Delaware has.”
Biggest Challenge of the 1990s and Beyond
The droughts in 1995, 1999, and 2002 became progressively worse as each one occurred. The drought of 2002 became the worst one since water records have been kept, breaking the record of the 1963 drought. “After ’95 when we threw everything we had out the door, we were just handling things very much by the ‘seat of the pants.’ Once we saw what the droughts were doing to the businesses and how they revolted en masse, that led us to sit down and form a coalition working group to completely revise the way we worked,” says Lovell.
The basis of what determined Delaware’s drought status under the DRBC was a simplistic indicator system developed by a part-time, non-permanent seasonal employee whom Lovell replaced. It was based on just two parameters: stream flows and precipitation.
“I didn’t like this simple index at all and I said so,” says Lovell. “But I was roundly ignored. When the big drought hit in 1995, we were in the midst of an emergency situation and our indictor was not even showing us to be in drought status yet.
“Some of the old indicators, such as measuring stream flow with one stream gauge or precipitation from one station, clearly gave us a very limited picture. At that point Delaware, as everywhere else, was at the dawn of Internet capabilities, including hydrological monitoring capabilities. We were able to put our finger on so much more information in near real time shortly after the drought,” says Lovell.
Water sources for this entire region are spread out over a wide area. Therefore the state was now able to look at far more indicators simultaneously than it ever had before. It was also able to evaluate what the available supply was on nearly an instantaneous basis, compared to what the demand pattern looked like.
“The network of water suppliers was so tight and we had such a good line of communication with them that they would feed us daily demand data,” says Lovell. “That’s how we developed this much more sophisticated drought monitoring and response plan. The Internet information greatly aided access and became more and more sophisticated in subsequent droughts.”
That allowed the state to begin documenting all the different indices that are now in its plan. The state now has 13 different indicators, including access to each stream gauge on public water supply streams and access to a number of gauges outside the state of Delaware.
Delaware also uses time-ranked precipitation totals from two precipitation stations because it has also found out that one station tends to over-report and another tends to under-report, so it blends them together to have an even better picture.
The state also uses reservoir water levels. The Octorara Reservoir providing water to Chester, PA, out of which the state taps, was also used for some supply. Groundwater levels are used as well. Lovell especially objected to the old system because groundwater levels were not accounted for. Records for some of Delaware’s groundwater wells go back 50 years.
“Groundwater data had largely, and mistakenly, been ignored,” says Lovell. “But now we use everything we can put our hands on when it comes to data, including groundwater data. The really significant feature to the present system is that not one of them and not all of these various condition indicators dictate what our response action is. It’s pure guidance because the indicators are only that, not triggers. That’s an important distinction.”
Another resource in studying drought, according to Gerald K. Kauffman, water coordinator for northern Delaware, comes from a close look at the trees within the state. Kauffman, who is also the director of the University of Delaware’s Water Resources Agency, says the state had just finished with the 1999 drought, which at the time Delaware felt was one of the more significant droughts it’d ever had, and then three years later in 2002 it had the Great Mid-Atlantic Drought. “This was the 25th worst drought in the region since approximately 367 AD,” says Kauffman. “Our records from data recorded along the Brandywine Creek only extend back to 1911 and the precipitation record only back to 1895. We analyzed tree ring data compiled by the Columbia University Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory to extend a simulated Brandywine Creek stream flow record back almost 1,700 years.
“The literature indicates that the thin rings studied are much more useful in correlating drought conditions than the wider rings that may indicate wet, cooler years. Thin tree ring width is perhaps most especially useful in extending drought records back in time.”
Going Against the Flow in Drought Planning
Many states in the Delaware River Basin Commission use hard, fixed triggers that say when you have water at point “x” you declare this type of a drought; when at point “y” and when at “z” you are at the next step. “We do not have that system,” says Lovell. “Ours is actually more of a happenstance system because we aren’t a huge reservoir-driven water supply system, as in a lot of areas, where everything they do is based on preserving reservoir storage capacity. With ours we have such a different mix of water sources that we can’t simply say when we reach ‘x’ we take that certain action.”
Delaware’s indicators have been grouped into what generally would apply to a certain drought status. But that doesn’t mean that when any one of them or all of them are in that range, the state has to take that action. In the past, when a range was reached there was a general agreement on what the corresponding action should be.
“But it’s not a trigger, per se,” says Lovell. “It doesn’t mean we are going to declare a drought warning, drought watch, or drought emergency. We don’t have a tremendous amount of reservoir storage, but it’s been proven we have more capability with the reservoirs than we’ve given ourselves credit for.”
Delaware’s drought “acid test” occurred when the state’s governor hired a consultant to do the analysis in the aftermath of the record drought of 2002. The consultant reported that the state had come through the drought with more water than anyone on the Eastern Seaboard, according to Lovell. “The state was in tremendous shape. It was well managed—including cooperation from state residents who were fairly responsive in controlling their discretionary water use,” says Lovell.
For the lower part of the state there is so much fresh, available groundwater relative to the population that it is virtually impossible for this area of Delaware to have a supply shortage. But when studies were done on population growth trends in the north, including estimates of water availability, the supply and demand lines were going to cross at some point in the future.
“They started thinking about all kinds of long-distance transmission lines to bring untold gallons of water north,” says Lovell. “The idea of that, politically, went down in flames.”
But when the 1999 drought occurred, the state still had a much better system. “Ironically, everyone was happy,” says Lovell. “They had the latitude they needed to be able to just get by but keep running their businesses. The governor at the time expected the drought to end as if it was scheduled. But actually it kept getting worse and worse. Panic set in.”
When Pennsylvania experienced the 1999 drought, it also had a revolt by golf courses and sports field managers and other outdoor concerns, resulting in its own changes in its plan and its restrictions. The template developed by the DRBC had to be adapted by that state too.
“But Delaware’s revisions are much more fine-tuned,” says Lovell. “Pennsylvania made some general revisions, which loosened things up for the outdoor water-use businesses, but we had more direct input from businesses involved.”
A new plan was implemented in 2002. “That plan worked like a charm and the administration trusted what we were doing. We got through without a hitch. The rules were established for how the outdoor businesses were going to run—we let them stay operational. We also received excellent cooperation from the public. They were willing to put up with a little inconvenience knowing that the utilities were taking positive steps to increase their supplies,” says Lovell.
A Pair of Water Projects Holds Part of the Answer for Newark
In 1990, Ron Gardner took office as the mayor of a Delaware city still grappling with water-quality and -supply problems. Newark’s aging water system had a limited capacity and used wells contaminated with water containing large quantities of iron.
|
Photo: University of Delaware |
| Newark Reservoir, August 2005 |
The mayor insisted something be done. He assembled a panel of various agency representatives and other experts in the field. This group met for approximately one year on a regular basis, coming up with a number of solutions. The idea of a new reservoir was not something they considered then; they’d concentrated on fixing up what they had because it was in such a deteriorated condition.
“After years of indecision, Newark finally implemented one of the recommendations our department championed for years: the need to build an iron removal plant so that millions of gallons of pumpable yet undrinkable groundwater could be used,” says Lovell.
“It took them over a decade; but they finally got the iron removal plant built, dedicated in 2003. At the same time they were rolling along on that track, the extremely bad droughts came and showed the city how insufficient the water supply was.”
Even with the addition of new well capacity, the City of Newark still did not have enough. The city became disgruntled with buying water from another utility, as this was getting fairly expensive. “They bit the bullet and said they were going to build a new reservoir and put an end to all of this nonsense,” says Lovell.
The result of all this was the building of a 300-million-gallon reservoir, providing 100% self-sufficiency for Newark. Funding for this project came from multiple sources, including bond issues, across-the-board rate increases, and state contributions. “That’s where Newark is right now,” says Lovell. “The reservoir was only just filled during the spring of 2006. Testing is currently being done to make sure the controls and flows are the way they are supposed to be.”
White Clay Creek, the stream that is the city’s main water-supply source, has high turbidity during periods of excess water flow. Now at those times the city can simply switch to using the reservoir water. This makes the reservoir something that helps with quality issues as well. The reservoir has other uses than backup supply, but that is primarily what it’s used for.
Both the nascent Newark reservoir and Wilmington’s reservoir are 100% pump storage facilities. They don’t have river flow to keep them filled, and both have a very small drainage area to help with recharge. However, if a thunderstorm occurs upstream, the fact that it didn’t happen directly over the water body doesn’t matter. When the surge in extra water occurs in the creek, that extra amount is pumped up to the reservoirs.
Planning Ahead
One of the main goals of Delaware’s water agencies in 2000 was to assemble 2 billion gallons of water supply by 2003. This was something the governor wanted fast-tracked, according to Kauffman.
Kauffman feels that Delaware’s being a small state may have contributed to the success it has had in accomplishing what it has with drought planning. “It’s rare that there would be a move in six years from the concept of implementing water storage and then getting it in the ground,” says Kauffman. “That’s a pretty quick turnaround. An important reason is that former Governor Carper recognized this to be a priority at the highest level of state government and our current Governor Ruth Anne Minner has continued the priority by amending the 2000 law, the ‘Water Supply Coordinating Council Act,’ in 2003 by expanding its role statewide for a term to expire in 2010.
“Therefore Delaware has taken the bold step of breaking the age-old procrastination cycle, the so-called hydro-illogical cycle, with drought planning and preparation, much to its credit.”
|
Photo: University of Delaware |
| The reservoir provides Newark with 100% self-sufficiency. |
A main lesson learned in the course of fixing the state’s drought plan is the discovery that, because of the multiple uses for water, it is impossible to predict what a simple water-use restriction is going to do to someone. “We think we have the bases covered,” says Lovell. “But there are always surprises out there too. You must make a decision, and the best thing you could ever do is not have to declare a drought emergency because the panic that sets in is hard to predict or gauge.
“Panic brings out the worst in people to a large degree. As good as we have crafted our rules, you don’t want to have to impose them. People tend to become unpredictable in their behavior—to say the least. Some will scavenge every drop to water their plants; others will call and tell you that they pay their bills and that they can use as much water as they want; these same people will then turn their sprinklers on in the middle of the day just to spite us.”
Lovell feels that Delaware, in effect, now has a new drought operating plan it will probably never have to use. “That’s the bottom line,” says Lovell. “We’ve learned so much about what our needs are, and how to handle the drought issues, and added the new supply [eventually an extra 2 billion gallons of storage to the system], plus various new projects. It would take the region being transformed into Arizona for the state to be in trouble. I just don’t see that happening.”
That the East Coast simply doesn’t stay dry works in Delaware’s favor. The state, like others in the region, gets rainfall even during a drought. “But now we have the capability to capture any storm runoff,” adds Lovell. “Any stray thunderstorms will yield water that now may be pumped off-stream up to the reservoirs. We’re constantly able to refill them. I rest much easier knowing that we can handle nearly anything that nature can hit us with. Now I’m not going to worry—at least about drought issues.”